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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
*************** 
MOVIE FILMS INC., 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
-vs-
FIRST SECURITY BANK 
OF UTAH, N .A., a 
corporation, 
Defendant-Appellant 
********************* 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE 
OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
11259 
Plaintiff seeks to recover money 
paid out by defendant Bank from plain-
tiff's corporate checking account,on 
the ground that checks so paid were 
signed by the president alone rather 
than two officers as originally contem-
plated. 
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried on March 22, 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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1968, before the Honorable Stewart M. 
Hanson, Judge, without a jury. The 
court rendered its memorandum decision 
(R. 11) giving judgment for plaintiff 
against defendant in the amount of 
$5,470.30. Upon the entry of Findings, 
Conclusions and Judgment (R. 14-16) , 
defendant filed its motion to amend the 
Findings, Conclusions and Judgment (R. 
17-18). After hearing thereon, the 
court denied defendant's motion (R. 19) 
and notice of this appeal was subsequen-
tly filed. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal of the 
judgment on the ground that plaintiff's 
corporate president had ample authority 
as a matter of fact and law to be sole 
· the checks paid by defendant signator on 
Bank. In the alternative, defendant seeks 
- 2 -
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reduction of the judgment by the amount 
of $3,170.34 because at least two checks 
were paid for proper corporate obliga-
tions and plaintiff suffered no loss by 
defendant's actions, even assuming, 
arguendo, that defendant was negligent 
in paying the checks bearing only one 
signature. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff is a Utah corporation 
organized July 19, 1966, under Articles 
of Incorporation showing David Patterson, 
President and Director, William Cramer, 
Vice-President, Secretary-Treasurer and 
Director, and D. Ann Bullock, Director 
(Exh. D-17). No corporate minutes exist 
showing a change of officers until Sep-
tember 15, 1966 (Exh. D-23). 
On or about August 1, 1966, plain-
tiff opened a checking account with the 
- 3 -
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Highland Drive Office of defendant 
Bank. A "Corporation-Account-Author-
ization" (Exh. P-1) was filed with the 
Bank showing the signatures of "David 
Patterson," President and "Rex L. Jensen, 11 
Vice-President. The name of Patterson 
was typed as "Shawn D. Patterson" but 
the signature was in the form of "David 
Patterson. 11 A signature card was also 
filed (Exh. D-30) showing the signatures 
of "David Patterson," President and "Rex 
L. Jensen," Vice-President, with a nota-
tion that both signatures were required 
for payment of checks. 
Thereafter, a number of checks were 
drawn pn the account beginning on August 
15, 1966, all of which checks contained 
only the signature of Shawn D. Patterson 
(Exhs. P-3 through P-9 and D-18 through 
D-22 are the only checks in evidence). 
- 4 -
c 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
When one of the earliest of said checks 
was presented, it was brought to the 
Bank by Shawn D. Patterson on August 
16, 1966, with the request that a 
cashier's check be made payable to R. L. 
Polk & Company. Said check (Exh. P-3, 
payable to "cash, 11 in the amount of 
$139.92) was signed by Shawn D. Patterson. 
The teller to whom the check was presented 
raised the question that only one signa-
ture was on the check when the signature 
card (Exh. D-30) required two signatures 
(R. 71, L. 5). Thereafter, Mr. Patterson 
stated to the Bank personnel that it was 
not their original intention to require 
two signatures and that he could not con-
duct the business in Salt Lake and have 
Mr. Jensen in Las Vegas if Mr. Jensen's 
signature were required (R. 72, L. 17). . . 
- 5 -
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Mr. Patterson was then instructed re-
garding execution of a new signature. 
card and a new Corporation-Acount-
Authorization to reflect the expressed 
desire of requiring only one signature 
on the account. The new signature card 
was signed "Shawn D. Patterson" as Presi-
dent of Movie Films Inc. and left with 
the Bank (Exh. D-31). The Corporation-
Acount-Authorization form was handed 
to Mr. Patterson but was not returned to 
the Bank (R. 82, L. 5). 
The business of plaintiff was selling 
movie cameras and affiliated accessories 
in package "units" (R. 28, L. 5). Prior 
to commencing business in Utah, a written 
agreement was signed in Las Vegas between 
Rex L. Jensen and Shawn D. Patterson re-
flecting some of the economics of the 
- 6 -
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business. Mr Patt · erson was to receive 
$75.00 as commission for each unit sold, 
(Exh. P-34) in addition to any commis-
sions earned by other salesmen (R. 31, 
L. 7). Mr. Jensen supplied ten units 
upon commencing business, and subsequently 
Mr. Jensen furnished an additional eight 
units (R. 32, L. 20). The equipment 
units were manufactured by Technicolor 
Corp. and were obtained through a distri-
butor named Cottrell Distributing Co., of 
Denver, Colorado (R. 43, L. 5). (Please 
note that Exh. D-27, L. 2, shows the 
correct spelling of Cottrell: the reporter 
throughout the transcript has used the 
spelling Cotret or Codret, but all such 
references are to the same distributing 
company.) Additional units were subse-
quently received in Salt Lake City, one 
- 7 -
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by shipment through REA Express received 
August 23, 1966, (Exh. D-27 and R. 62, 
L. 25) the other units having been 
shipped to the post off ice and picked up 
later by another party apparently after 
Patterson's departure from the business 
(R. 39, L. 16). The shipment at REA 
Express was paid for by means of a check 
on the corporate account made payable 
to cash in the sum of $1,820.34 (Exh. 
P-4) which was converted to a cashier's 
check payable to REA Express in the same 
amount and deposited by REA Express on 
August 23, 1966, (Exh. P-11). 
The business of plaintiff included 
assigning the customer's installment 
purchase contracts to a financial insti-
tution, principally Nationwide Acceptance 
company, Salt Lake City, which Mr. Jensen 
- 8 -Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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knew at the outset (R. 31, L. 24). Mr. 
Patterson, as president of plaintiff, 
executed a "Master Dealer Agreement #1, 
non-recourse" (Exh. D-28) under which 
contracts were subsequently assigned to 
Nationwide. Each contract was endorsed 
on behalf of Movie Films Inc. by David 
Patterson (Exh. D-29). Mr. Jensen was 
informed that at least three cash sales 
and fifteen contract sales had been 
effected (R. 48, L. 1). However, the 
summary provided by the finance company 
to plaintiff (Exh. P-25 and R. 57, L. 23) 
evidenced eighteen contract sales through 
August 25th, thus creating a total of 
twenty-one units sold including the cash 
sales. 
On or about September l, 1966, Mr. 
Jensen learned that Mr. Patterson had 
departed Salt Lake City, (R. 40, L. 7), 
- 9 -
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and shortly thereafter he discovered 
that no units were left in the place of 
business (R. 39, L. 13). The bank ac-
count was intact and as of August 31st 
had $272.96 remaining (Exh. D-33). Be-
tween August 9, 1966 and August 31, 1966, 
deposits were made to the banking account 
in the aggregate amount of $8,034.48 
(Exh. D-33). Of the various checks which 
had been paid out from the corporate ac-
count, Mr. Patterson apparently received 
a considerable amount of cash, paid some 
corporate obligations, and left the follow-
ing checks in dispute: 
Schedule of Checks in Issue 
Exhibit No. Payee 
P-4 Cash 
(Exchanged for cashier's 
check, Exh. P-111, payable 
to REA Express) 
- 10 -
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$1820.34 
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(Schedule of Checks in Issue continued) 
P-5 
P-6 
Laury Miller 
Pontiac 
Cash 
(Exchanged for cashier's 
check, Exh. P-12, payable 
to J. Reed Tuft, endorsed, 
and cashed by Shawn D. 
Patterson) 
P-7 Cash 
(Exchanged for cashier's 
check, Exh. P-14, payable 
to J. Reed Tuft, endorsed, 
and cashed by Shawn D. 
Patterson) 
P-8 Cash 
(Exchanged for cashier's 
check, Exh. P-13, payable 
to J. Reed Tuft, endorsed, 
and cashed by Shawn D. 
Patterson) 
$ 42.02 
"$ 463.20 
$14 70. 00 
$1525.00 
P-9 First National $ 110.00 
Bank of Nevada 
D-19 Joan Nelsen $ 20.37 
$5450. 93 
- 11 -
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. DEFENDANT BANK WAS ENTITLED 
TO RELY ON THE AUTHORITY OF THE COR- · 
PORATE PRESIDENT IN ACCEPTING A SIGNA-
TURE CARD AND PAYING CHECKS SIGNED BY 
HIM ALONE. 
The facts as evidenced in the re-
cord reflect three basic conclusions 
relevant to this point of argument: 
(1) By reason of powers inherent 
by law in a corporate president, as mani-
fested by the actual authority exercised 
by Patterson, the record evidences his 
authority to execute a new signature card 
with the Bank even without the formality 
of a board resolution; indeed such a re-
solution would have been futile as a 
matter of fact because of no valid and 
functioning board of directors; 
(2) Rex L. Jensen was the moving 
force behind plaintiff but clothed 
Patterson with full ostensible and actual 
- 12 -
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authority to handle the entire business; 
(3) Because of Patterson's actual 
authority exercised as president of the 
corporation, and Jensen's lack of attempt 
to limit the authority so being exercised 
by Patterson, this corporation cannot now 
be heard to say that Patterson did not 
possess legal authority to conduct the 
banking business: 
This discussion can focus at once 
on the important operative facts. The 
original signature card containing both 
the signatures of Patterson and Jensen 
(Exh. D-30) was replaced on or about 
August 16, 1966, with the signature card 
bearing only the signature of Patterson 
(Exh. D-31). The Corporation-Account-
Authorization (Exh. P-1) filed with the 
first card did not have its counterpart 
with the second card, which, of course, 
- 13 - c 
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is the only factual point which suggests 
the Bank may have been negligent. Ad-
mittedly, it was the practice of the Bank 
to require such a resolution (R. 77, L. 6). 
Viewing the matter realistically, however, 
the.corporate resolution is a formality, 
and though consistent with accepted cor-
porate practice, it is a formality which 
in any event could not have been lawfully 
carried out in this instance. 
The signature card itself constitutes 
the contract between the Bank and the 
depositor, and recites on the face thereof: 
The Bank is hereby authorized to 
recognize the signatures executed 
below in the payment of funds or 
the transaction of any other bus-
iness of said corporation. The 
conditions as set forth on the 
reverse side are hereby accepted 
as a part of this contract. (Exh. 
D-31) 
Immediately.below said recitation, Shawn 
. . 
D. Patterson, President of Movie Films, 
Inc., executed the signature card contract 
- 14 - t 
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on August 16th. Defendant submits that 
said action could not have been ratified 
by the board of directors because there 
was no functioning board at the time. 
The Articles of Incorporation (Exh. D-17) 
appointed Patterson, Cramer and Bullock 
as directors and officers. Notwithstanding 
the testimony that Jensen, Patterson and 
Phillips were appointed officers and dir-
ectors in a meeting held about August 15 
(R. 43, L. 28), such an action could not 
possibly have been taken validly because 
Bullock and Cramer were still officers 
and directors, without resignation. The 
minutes of the September 15, 1966 meeting 
(Exh. D-23) reflect that Cramer did not 
resign until that date, and Bullock and 
Patterson were removed as stockholders 
for non-payment of their subscription, but 
their resignation or removal as officers 
- 15 -
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never does appear. An irreconcilable 
conflict appears with respect to handling 
the corporate organization, and the only 
clear fact emerging is that Patterson was 
the only consistent and functioning dir-
ector and officer from July 19, 1966, the 
date of incorporation, until at least the 
end of August when he departed. Admittedly, 
we are better informed now than the Bank 
was on August 16th, but why insist on the 
formality of a board resolution to back up 
the actions of the president, when there 
was no legally constituted board even 
acting at the time? The actual exercise 
of the authority of Patterson, including 
the dealings with the Bank, is very con-
sistent with the manner in which plaintiff 
had established him in charge of its affairs 
It is interesting to note that both 
the trial Court in its memorandum decision 
- 16 -
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(R. 11) and Jensen and his counsel (R. 56, 
L. 26 and R. 77, L. 19) described Patterson 
as a "conniver," a "con man" or a "crook," 
and yet both attempted to assert that the 
Bank was negligent in being taken in by 
such a disreputable character. Defendant 
submits that Jensen and plaintiff corpora-
tion should be estopped from making such 
a claim against the Bank, not merely as 
an equitable principle of law, but as part 
of the factual background supporting de-
fendant's notion that Jensen clothed 
Patterson with full authority to act on 
behalf of the business in every aspect, 
and took no steps to limit or investigate 
the actual use of such authority. In 
addition to the corporate irregularities 
noted above which leave Patterson the only 
functioning officer and director, we note 
- 17 -Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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that it was Patterson, and not Jensen 
I 
who had communication with the corporate 
counsel, J. Reed Tuft, in establishing 
the corporation and commencing its business 
(R. 45, L. 8). Jensen was not even an 
incorporator (Exh. D-17), but admittedly 
supplied the initial money. Patterson 
was the sales manager and office manager 
(R. 29, L. 23), and as such he ordered 
additional equipment units to sell, paid 
for them at REA Express (Exhs. D-27, P-4 
and P-11) and supervised the sale of at 
least eighteen units on contract (Exh. P-25) 
and perhaps three additional units for 
cash (R. 48, L. 1). Patterson signed the 
dealer agreement with Nationwide Acceptance 
Co. (Exh. D-28), and by his sole signature 
endorsed the customers' purchase contracts 
to the finance company (Exh. D-29). 
Patterson hired and fired the office help 
- 18 -
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and the salesmen (R. 49, L. 1). All of 
the foregoing except the REA Express . 
transaction were fully known and consented 
to by Jensen, who, though perhaps not a 
legally constituted officer, provided the 
financial backing for plaintiff and has 
caused this action to be commenced. 
Patterson wrote many checks in pay-
ment of corporate obligations, many of 
them before Jensen's visit to Salt Lake 
City on August 15, 1966, (R. 49, L. 25 and 
Exhs. D-18, D-19, D-20, D-21, D-22). Jensen 
didn't ask for the records or the check-
book to see how Patterson was conducting 
the business or if he had paid any normal 
operating expenses of the business (R. 50, 
L. 2) • 
During the entire period when Patterson 
was dealing with the Bank, no facts and 
circumstances appeared to put the Bank 
on notice that the funds from the account 
might be diverted to Patterson's own use, t 
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for the various checks were payable to 
parties who might be normal business 
accounts, including the corporate counsel. 
The Bank had no duty of inquiry when there 
was nothing suspicious about the checks 
or the officer's conduct, Havana Cent. R. 
Co. v. Central Trust Co. of N.Y. (2nd Cir. 
1913) 204 Fed. 546. 
The actual powers of the corporate 
president as manifested by Patterson have 
been noted above. The governing law in 
Utah is: 
While it is true that, ordinarily, 
the president of a corporation, as 
such, has no inherent power to exe-
cute contracts in general without 
express authority of its board of 
directors yet when, as here, the 
president is also the general man-
ager of the company authorized to 
act under its by-laws, and has been 
long accustomed to transact all the 
corporate business, his power and 
the legality of his acts may not 
be questioned, especia~ly when e~­
ercised and performed in good faith 
and in the absence of fraud. (Passow 
& Sons v. Wetherbee, (1917) 50 Ut. 
243, 167 P. 350, 352. 
- 20 - c 
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In the present case, the Bank certainly 
had no knowledge of any bad faith or 
fraud of Patterson. 
In the case of Shircliff v. Dixie 
Drive-In Theatre (1955) 7 Ill. App. 2d 
346, the Court sustained the right of a 
corporate president to execute a note even 
without approval of the directors, and 
the trial court's conclusions, affirmed 
on appeal, are very relevant here: 
The trial court found that O'Keefe, 
as President, transacted the entire 
business of the corporation, and, 
in fact, the directors were appar-
ently a little less than nominal, 
if possible. Under these circum-
stances the corporation held him 
out as the agent to transact busi-
ness. There is nothing in this. 
transaction but what would ordin-
arily be included in the ordinary 
business of the corporation. (129 
N.E. 2d, 348). 
More specifically in the area of a 
corporate employee who makes checks pay-
able to "cash 11 and obtains the funds for 
21 -
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his own benefit, it has been held that 
the Bank is not liable therefor where 
the employee was acting within the scope 
of his apparent authority in the business. 
This employee, one of three authorized to 
sign checks, had exclusive charge of the 
bank business of the company. Harlan E. 
Moore & Co. v. The Champaign National Bank 
(1957) 13 Ill. App. 2d 232, 141 N.E. 2d 97. 
Defendant submits that in the case at bar, 
Patterson was acting within the scope of 
his actual and apparent authority in ex-
clusively conducting the banking business 
with defendant. 
In another case very much in point, 
it has been held that where the president 
of a corporation opened a bank account 
and gave a signature card with his name 
attached as president, without a formal 
board resolution, and thereafter drew 
- 22 -
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checks in accordance with the signature 
card, the ordinary rule requiring a 
board resolution authorizing corporate 
action should be relaxed with reference 
to commercial transactions of an ordinary 
business nature wherein the president has 
implied authority to carry on such business: 
I find as a fact, and rule as a 
matter of law, that the bank was 
justified and fully protected in 
paying out the money upon the 
order of the Brenner & Brody Shoe 
Company, signed by the person de-
positing the same. Sawyer v. 
Rochester Trust Co. (D.C. N.N. 
1931) 45 Fed. 2d 867, 871) 
Also relevant is Dexter Savings Bank 
v. Friend (D.C. Ohio 1898) 90 Fed. 703, 
wherein it is held: 
In the absence of legislative 
enactment, or provision made 
in the by-laws, corporations 
usually act through their pres-
ident. He being the legal head 
of the body, when an act is . 
performed by him the presumpti~n 
will be indulged that the act is 
legally done, and is binding upon 
the body. (90 Fed. 706) 
- 23 - t 
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Defendant submits that all of the 
foregoing discussion of facts and appli-
cable law result in the inescapable con-
clusion that Patterson, as president 
and the only functioning officer of Movie 
Films, Inc., had the actual authority to 
create a new contract with the Bank where-
in his sole signature was required for 
payment of corporate checks, and that the 
Bank was justified in relying on his 
authority. Accordingly, the judgment 
should be reversed, and judgment for the 
defendant against the plaintiff directed. 
POINT II. CHECKS PAID BY DEFENDANT BANK 
IN DISCHARGE OF PROPER CORPORATE OBLIGA-
TIONS CANNOT CONSTITUTE LOSS TO PLAINTIFF, 
EVEN ASSUMING NEGLIGENCE OF THE BANK. 
As an alternative to complete rever-
sal of the judgment, defendant seeks 
reduction of the judgment by $3,170.34, 
- 24 -
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representing amounts paid for proper 
corporate obligations of plaintiff. The 
sum of $1,820.34 was paid for equipment 
and at least $1,350.00 of the money taken 
by Patterson was due as commission. The 
law is so elementary as to obviate any 
necessity of citations that even assuming 
negligence of the Bank in paying checks 
if no loss to plaintiff resulted therefrom, 
no recovery can be obtained. 
The business of plaintiff was selling 
movie units, and when the supply of units 
available was dwindling by reason of sales, 
it is natural in the ordinary course of 
business that the president ?nd sales 
manage~ should purchase some more. Ac-
cordingly, Patterson executed a check to 
11 cash 11 for $1, 82 O. 34, {Exh. P-4) exchanged 
it for a cashier's check in the same 
amount {Exh. P-11), and delivered the 
same to REA Express on August 23, 1966 
c 
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(R. 63, L. 10 and R. 62, L. 25). The 
records of REA Express (Exh. D-27) clearly 
show the shipment from Cottrell Distri-
buting Co., Denver, admittedly the source 
of the movie units for plaintiff (R. 43, 
L. 5). This probably constituted eight 
units @ $225.00 per unit, totaling 
$1,800.00. Equipment cost was estimated 
at $230.00 per unit by Jensen (Exh. P-34). 
Since at least fifteen contract sales had 
been made by August 23rd (Exh. P-25) and 
three cash sales (R. 48, L. 3), the orig-
inal supply of eighteen units was exhausted 
and the new shipment arrived just in time. 
On August 23rd and 24th, another three 
contract sales were made (Exh. P-25). 
Defendant submits that no question 
whatever can exist regarding the payment 
of a proper .corporate obligation by the 
$1,820.34 of Exh. P-4, so plaintiff in-
- 26 -
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curred no loss by the Bank's payment of 
that check with only one signature. 
The other item of corporate debt 
relates to the commission due Patterson. 
He was to receive $75.00 commission for 
every unit sold (R. 31, L. 10). Even 
disregarding the three cash sales con-
cerning which there is testimony but no 
documentary evidence, it is absolutely 
clear that at least eighteen units were 
sold on contract (Exh. P-25). The trial 
Court correctly computed the total com-
mission due (18 x $75.00) as $1,350.00 
(R. 48, L. 23 and R. 57, L. 12). Al-
though Jensen testified that Patterson 
was to deduct his commission (R. 33, L. 25), 
yet it appears obvious that the proceeds 
of sale came after assignment to the 
finance company. Upon deposit of those 
proceeds, therefore, Patterson was en-
titled to take out his commission. 
- 27 - c 
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Jensen testified that sales at 
various prices should have resulted in 
proceeds of approximately $8,220.00 or 
$8,230.00 (R. 57, L. 28). The finance 
company showed total sales of $8,280.00 
(Exh. P-25). The bank statement showed 
deposits after August 9th (not including 
the original $1,000.00 deposited by Jensen) 
totaling $8,034.48 (Exh. D-33). The money 
thus deposited was pretty close to the 
total sale proceeds, especially consider-
ing the finance company retention. 
Defendant submits, therefore, that 
Patterson deposited all the money and 
was entitled to take his commission from 
the checking account. On August 26th, 
Patterson drew a check for $1,470.00 
(Exh. P-7), exchanged it for a cashier's 
check (Exh. P-14), obtained the endorse-
ment of the payee, J. Reed Tuft, endorsed 
- 28 -
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it himself and cashed it at a bank (re-
verse of Exh. P-14) . Of the money thus 
obtained, $1,350.00 was unquestionably 
due Patterson for commissions earned. 
The foregoing result is the only 
common-sense conclusion from the record. 
It also conforms with the law in point 
which declares that a check paid negli-
gently by a bank which discharges a cor-
porate debt of the depositor cannot be 
the basis for any recovery against the 
Bank, for the depositor has suffered no 
loss. Industrial Savings Board v. People's 
Funeral Service Corp. (C.C.A. D.C. 1924) 
296 Fed. 1006 and Sawyer v. Rochester 
Trust Co., supra, p. 23. 
The total of the two debts thus paid 
is $3,170.34, which deducted from the 
judgment of $5,450.93, leaves the balance 
of $2,280.59. If the Bank is found to be 
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negligent under Point I, of the argument, 
the judgment should certainly be reduced 
to the latter figure. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing discussion 
of the facts and applicable law, defendant 
requests the Court on this appeal to re-
verse the judgment and direct entry of 
judgment in favor of defendant and against 
plaintiff. The president and managing 
officer of plaintiff was clothed with 
substantial authority and exercised the 
same with knowledge of other parties in-
terested in plaintiff. Accordingly, he 
was authorized to effect a new contract 
with defendant in which a signature card 
was presented and signed, thus authorizing 
the Bank to pay checks on his sole sig-
nature. 
- 30 -
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In the alternative, and if the 
foregoing request is not granted by 
the Court, the judgment should be re-
duced by the amount of $3,170.34 repre-
senting checks paid by defendant in dis-
charge of proper corporate obligations of 
plaintiff, as a result of which plaintiff 
suffered no loss. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
B~ 
DON B. ALLEN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
- 31 -
c 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
